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NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
REPRESENTATIVE ACTION PROVISION

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) prohibit the payment of substandard wages 1 and forbid sex and age discrimination 2
in employment. Both statutes provide for special representative actions
by which aggrieved employees 3 may sue on behalf of themselves and
the class of similarly situated employees. 4 Rule 23, however, does not
apply, and only similarly situated employees who "opt into" the statutory
action are bound by or benefit from it. s Employees must opt into the
action by filing a written consent with the court in which the suit is
brought. 6 Plaintiffs often seek to notify class members of the action's
pendency to aggregate the total number of claims and increase the
amount of any settlement. The FLSA and the ADEA, however, neither
explicitly provide for nor prohibit such notice. 7
1. The FLSA requires payment of minimum wages to employees engaged in commerce or
producing goods for commerce, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976), and overtime wages for all work over
40 hours per week, 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
2. The ADEA prohibits certain hiring, employment, and labor union practices that discriminate
on the basis of the age of adult job applicants, employees, and union members. 29 U.S.C. §
626(b) (1976).
The Equal Pay Act amended the FLSA in 1963, prohibiting sex discrimination by certain
employers that pay different wages to employees performing equal work. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)
(1976). It treats amounts owed to such employees as unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime
compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(3).
3. The term "employee" is used to convenience throughout this Note, but the analyses and
conclusions of this Note also apply to ADEA representative actions brought by job applicants
and union members. See supra note 2.
4. The FLSA states that actions may be maintained "by any one or more employees for
and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
The ADEA incorporates this provision. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2I6(b), 626(b). This opt-in requirement differs from the Federal Rules of
~ivil Procedure, which state that members of a certified class are bound by the result of the
class action unless they opt out. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3). See, e.g., Woods v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1982); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d
859, 862 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1977).
6. 29 u.s.c. § 216(b) (1976).
1. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982); Baker v. Michie
Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442
(N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
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Federal courts currently apply different standards concerning the permissibility of notice. Although the Ninth Circuit forbids notice 8 and
the Seventh Circuit grants plaintiffs a right to send notice, 9 the Second
Circuit permits notice only in appropriate cases. 10 This Note advocates
that plaintiffs in FLSA and ADEA actions should be allowed to notify
potential class members in appropriate cases. Part I analyzes inherent
court powers, statutes, legislative history, and federal policies relating
to notice. It concludes that enactment of FLSA and ADEA remedies
did not alter the inherent power of federal courts to permit or prohibit
notice. On the contrary, only judicial discretion in permitting notice
fully achieves the basic congressional purposes underlying the FLSA
and the ADEA. Part II proposes specific factors courts should consider
in allowing or denying notice.
I.

PERMISSIBnITY OF NOTICE IN FLSA AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS

ADEA

The FLSA and the ADEA do not explicitly allow or prohibit plaintiffs from notifying interested persons of the opportunity to join a
representative action. Although the Portal-to-Portal Act later amended
the FLSA representative action provision to limit joinder of class
members to those who opt into the action, 11 the amendments do not
8. See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Partlow v. Jewish
Orphans' Home Inc., 645 F.2d 757, 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that due process required notice
in some circumstances but notice was otherwise prohibited). But see Madrigal v. Green Giant
Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 134,068 (E.D. Wash. 1981); Joyce v. Sandia Laboratories, 92 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 134,103 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (leaving plaintiffs to decide whether to notify class members).
9. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 580 (7th Cir. 1982).
10. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (permitting notice in appropriate cases at the trial court's discretion), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 944 (1979). The Second Circuit has provided no detailed guidelines for determining when
notice is appropriate. Trial courts following the Second Circuit view have considerable discretion
to permit notice, even when due process does not require notice. In exercising this discretion,
trial courts consider a number of factors. See discussion infra notes 26 & 86.
In Haynes v. Singer Co., 696 F.2d 884 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit rejected plaintiff's demand for notice without deciding whether to follow the Second Circuit. Even under
the discretionary approach, denial of notice was proper because plaintiffs failed to support their
allegations. The District of Columbia Circuit has also declined to decide whether to follow the
Second Circuit. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 270 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding
a trial court denial of notice in a pending Equal Pay Act representative claim because notice
was unnecessary to protect class members' rights or to conduct the action fairly, but declining
to decide whether to follow the Second Circuit).
I I. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 added the opt-in requirement to the FLSA representative action provision and banned representative actions brought by a person designated by
an allegedly aggrieved employee, unless the person so designated is also a real party in interest.
Pub. L. No. 80-49, § 5(a), 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); see also S. REP.
No. 48, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1947); H. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1947).
Because the ADEA incorporated the FLSA representative action provision, the Portal-to-Portal
Act amendments also apply to ADEA cases. See supra note 4.
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expressly address the permissibility of notice. Therefore, courts must
seek other indications of a congressional intent to permit or forbid
notice. 12 Courts have considered the permissibility of notice prior to
the enactments of the FLSA, Portal-to-Portal Act, and ADEA; the
legislative history of these statutes; and federal policies. In addition,
courts should adopt plausible constructions of the provision that avoid
raising doubts about its constitutionality.

A. Legislative History of the Representative Action Provision
The failure of the FLSA to contain a notice provision implies a congressional intent to allow notice. Federal courts have inherent, discretionary power to permit notice. 13 Within a few years after the FLSA's
enactment, courts interpreted it to permit notice. 14 Unless there is clear
evidence of contrary intent, the FLSA should not be interpreted to
alter the traditional power of the judiciary. 15
12. See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 33S, 336 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, S64 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
An accepted method of determining legislative intent consists of studying the text of the statute;
related sections, administrative regulations, contemporaneously created legislation, proposed-but•
rejected legislation, and policy considerations. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 732-37 (1975) (determining legislative intent of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
13. See Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (court needs no
statute for its authority to permit notice); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1793, at 201 (1972) (referring to courts' "equitable powers" of notice); Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, S8 F.R.D. 313, 328 (1973) (citing Rule 23(d)(2) as codification of inherent power to notify absent class members). But see FED. EQ'OITY R. 38 (authorizing
class actions but not mentioning notice).
14. See Timberlake v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 3 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 31 l, 313 (S.D.
Iowa 1943) (an early case allowing notice).
Furthermore, contemporaneous decisions reveal that courts interpreted the FLSA representative action provision to facilitate joinder of absent class members. See, e.g., Tennessee Coal,
Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1943) (interpreting FLSA as
"remedial and humanitarian" and "not [to] be interpreted ina narrow, grudging manner"); Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., 10 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 110, 112 (6th Cir. 19S1) (purpose of
representative action provision is to facilitate intervention and allow representation); Culver v.
Bell & Loffland, Inc., 4 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 885, 886 (9th Cir. 1944) (representative action provision should be liberally construed to encourage representative actions to avoid a multipli•
city of suits); Fowkes v. Dravo Corp., 5 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 941, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(allowing class members to become party plaintiffs until time of final judgment).
Contemporaneous constructions are an accepted method of determining intent. See, e.g., Arrington v. National Broadcasting Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1982) (supporting court's
interpretation of FLSA amendments with contemporaneous construction). See generally NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274 (1974) (post-National Labor Relations Act decisions
providing necessary guidance in NLRA interpretation).
1S. Courts have been interpreting Congress's silence concerning notice as proof of preserving
notice. See, e.g., Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495-96 (\V.D. Va. 1982); Monroe v. United
Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (failure to find a congressional intent to
prohibit notice implies the continued permissibility of notice); McGinley v. Burroughs Corp.,
407 F. Supp. 903, 911 (E.D. Pa. 197S); cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
702-03 (1979) (assumption is always appropriate that Congress knows the law, and absence of
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The legislative histories of the FLSA, Portal-to-Portal Act, and ADEA
do not indicate that Congress intended to prohibit notice or create a
right to notify class members. 16 Of the FLSA's provisions, the representative action provision most closely relates to notice. 11 Congress amended
the representative action provision in the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,
intending to prevent representative plaintiffs from bringing similarly
situated employees into actions without their authorization. 18 This purpose does not imply any additional intent to prohibit notice. 19
The Portal-to-Portal Act also deleted prior provisions that allowed
employees to designate a nonemployee to maintain a representative action on their behalf. 20 Supporters feared that designating nonemployees
such as union officials might stimulate improper litigation21 and attorney solicitation. 22 Furthermore, the communications that troubled
congressmen in 1947 presented a greater possibility of improper attorney solicitation than do typical modern notifications of an opporlegislative action to change a contemporaneous judicial assumption provides evidence that "Congress
,!lt least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that assumption"); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 515, 581 (1978) (normal presumption that Congress acted with knowledge of relevant effects of a prior law applied to passage of the ADEA); Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach.
Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959) (no statute is to be construed as making alterations of the
common law that the statute does not fairly express).
16. The legislative history "does not clarify the procedures available in class actions brought
under§ 216(b) to enforce the substantive rights of the ADEA and the FLSA." Allen v. Marshall
Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at
2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); see 113 CoNG.
REc. 31,250, 34,725 (1967); 83 CONG. REC. 9260-64 (1938) (floor debates); see also H. REP.
No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (ADEA committee report); S. REP. No. 48, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947) (Portal-to-Portal Act committee report); S. REP. No. 37, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1947) (Portal-to-Portal Act committee report); H. REP. No. 326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
(Portal-to-Portal Act committee report).
11. See Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D. 494, 495 (W.D. Va. 1982).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); see 93 CoNG. REc. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell,
manager of portal-to-portal bill for majority); see also BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE PoRTALTo-PoRTAL ACT OF 1947, at 49 (1947).
The Portal-to-Portal Act barred suits for payment of wages for time spent on the job site
not working (putting on work clothes, moving from entrance to work site). For a congressional
exposition of the problems posed by portal-to-portal pay actions, see H. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947).
19. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982); see also BUREAU
OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 49 (opt-in provision seeks to assure that each named
plaintiff "will be fully aware or• the representative action and "in agreement with its objectives").
20. See supra note I I.
21. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 2093-94 (1947) (statements of Sen. Donnell); S. REP. No. 48,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947); Portal-to-Portal Wages: Hearings on S. 70 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 230-31 (1947 (statement
of Sen. Donnell).
22. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REc. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell); S. REP. No. 48, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1947); Regulating the Recovery of Portal-to-Portal Pay, and for Other
Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 584 and H.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. No. 2 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1947) (statement of Rep. Gwynne) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
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tunity to join a representative action. 23 Congressmen chose not to ban
informative, nonsolicitous con:imunications. 24 They objected to selfinterested solicitation by attorneys and encouragement of vast numbers
of suits. 25 Pennitting notice at the trial court's discretion more accurately
effectuates Congress's intent. 26 The legislative goals behind the Portalto-Portal Act amendments thus in no way indicate a congressional intent to prohibit all communications or notice in all representative actions.
In addition, the creation of representative actions and the opt-in procedure provide further evidence of an intent to allow notice. 21 In some
circumstances, a congressional intent to permit notice should be implied, because notice is necessary to implement the representative action provisions of the FLSA. 28 Only a discretionary approach, which
23. Compare S. REP. No. 37, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1947) (United Steelworkers circular
suggesting that "every steelworker" at a certain company sue before Congress eliminated portal-toportal pay actions, making suggestions for arrangements with local attorneys) with Johnson v.
American Airlines, S31 F. Supp. 9S7, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1982) and Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82
F.R.D. 613, 621-22 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (neither notice urging a particular response).
24. Cf. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-04 (1981) (general ban on communications
from plaintiffs to class members is inappropriate under Rule 23, notwithstanding the potential
of class actions for stimulating litigation and other "abuses").
2S. See 93 CoNO. REc. 2093-94 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell).
26. Courts following the Second Circuit view have discretion to permit notice in appropriate
cases, see supra note 10, and to deny notice when not appropriate, see Frank v. Capital Cities
Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dickey v. Wendy's Int'!, 24 Wage&·
Hour Cas. (BNA) 1026, 1027 (N.D. Ga. 1980). This discretion can be exercised with sensitivity
to the potential for improper solicitation. See Frank, 88 F.R.D, at 678 (permitting notification
of former employees of one division of corporation but not those of other divisions because
of concern about solicitation); Dickey, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) at 1027 (sharing concern
of earlier decision that notice sometimes may lead to improper solicitation).
Further support for the Second Circuit view is provided by the fact that courts following it
consider the effect of notice on the volume of litigation. See, e.g., Braunstein v. Eastern
Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 944 (1979); Johnson v. American Airlines, S31 F. Supp. 9S7, 960 & n.l (N.D. Tex. 1982);
Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, No.
82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, S1 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
27. Congress rejected several substitute amendments to the fair labor standards bill that did
not provide for representative actions by employees. See, e.g., 82 CoNo. REc. 1S91-92, 1604
(1947); 82 CONG. REc. 1660-61, 1679 (1947); 82 CONG. REc. 1833-34 (1947). Similarly, Congress
rejected proposals for protections against age discrimination that did not provide for representative actions by employees and job applicants. See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hear•
ings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Sen. Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-101 (1967) (statement and submission of Andrew J.
Biemiller, Legislative Director, AFL-CIO).
28. See Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d S78, 581 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding it
unlikely that Congress, having created a representative action procedure, would have wanted
to deny notice); Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. S24, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (because successful
implementation of the opt-in provision "requires broad dissemination of information to the class,"
farmworkers' action presents appropriate case for notice). A prohibition of notice may impair
the ability of class members to opt into a representative action. Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D.
613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (considering class members' poverty, lack of formal education and
other circumstances, the court concluded that without notice they probably would never know
how to seek redress). See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § SS.03, at
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considers whether notice is needed to provide class members with
a real opportunity to opt into a pending representative action, adequately promotes the intent to limit undesirable solicitation without
undermining express statutory remedies.
A proven need for notice in some circumstances does not require
the conclusion that there should be a right to notice in all cases. In
some circumstances, the representative action provision can be fully
implemented without notice. 29 For example, notice may not be necessary
when settlement offer letters 30 or union communications 31 already have
informed class members of a pending representative action and of FLSA
or ADEA rights. If potential plaintiffs have been otherwise informed,
legislative ·policies in favor of preventing undesirable solicitation 32 and
minimizing defendants' litigation expenses 33 support trial court discretion to deny notice.

B. Federal Policies
The underlying federal policies served by the FLSA34 strongly sug382-83 (4th ed. 1974) (power should be implied if necessary to exercise an expressly conferred
power).
29. See, e.g., Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,984 (W.D. Tex. 1981)
(noting that there was no language barrier and that employees were aware of FLSA action from
Department of Labor notices in defendant's stores); Dickey v. Wendy's Int'!., 24 Wage & Hour
Cas. (BNA) 1026, 1027 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (Secretary of Labor had already negotiated nationwide
settlement).
30. See Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 87 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 33,852 & n.3 (D. Mo. 1979)
(referring to an earlier decision where settlement offer letters provided sufficient awareness).
31. See Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
32. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text; see also Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dickey v. Wendy's Int'I, 24 Wage & Hour
Cas. (BNA) 1026, 1027 (N.D. Ga. 1981). As in Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 30
(E.D. La. 1975), the court in Dickey was concerned about improper solicitation. Because the
Secretary of Labor had already negotiated a nationwide settlement in related litigation with the
defendant, notice was denied. 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) at 1027.
33. See Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,984 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (notice
requiring thousands of letters).
34. Expressive and associational freedoms are the primary support for a right to notify. See
infra note 35. By adopting a discretionary approach that considers the facts of each case, however,
courts can avoid other constitutional objections. At least where notice poses imminent threat
of substantial harm to class members or rights of the parties that outweighs notice's advantages,
and the threat is reflected in specific court findings, the Constitution permits a narrowly tailored
denial of notice. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981) (Rule 23 requires
that ban of notice reflect weighing of need for a limitation on communications and potential
interference with parties' rights); Impervious Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil Co., 508 F. Supp.
720, 723 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (findings of direct, immediate, and irreparable harm); Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393, 396-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (denying sex discrimination plaintiffs' motion for notice because of parties' fair-trial interests and because right to notify was
not required by first amendment); MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LmOATION § 1.41, at 29 (5th ed. 1982)
(recommending specific findings). But see Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578,
580 (7th Cir. 1982) (where plaintiffs have a right to notice, courts can regulate the notice to
achieve federal goals but cannot prohibit it).
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gest the propriety of judicial discretion in permitting plaintiffs to notify
other potential plaintiffs of pending representative actions.
I. Protecting freedoms of speech and association and avoiding constitutionally doubtful statutory interpretations- The first amendment
protects certain speech and associational rights of FLSA and ADEA
plaintiffs, counsel, and class members necessary for effective group
legal action. 3 ' These litigation-related rights require courts to avoid
restraints on notification unless they are drafted -cautiously and justified
by the "likelihood of serious abuses" by plaintiffs or counsel in particular cases. 36
Advocates of a ban on notification identify many abuses to justify
prohibition of notice unless it is required by. due process: solicitation
of clients, funds, or other support; stimulation of litigation; communications misrepresenting the action's status; contradiction of court orders;
and the danger of the appearance of judicial support. 37
Nevertheless, judicial efforts to prevent such abuses endanger expressive and associational freedoms. 38 Less restrictive ways of preventing the abuses may be available in individual cases and are preferable
to bans on notification that interfere with class formation or inhibit
the prosecution of the representative action. 39 A blanket prohibition
35. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1980} (en bane} (trial court ban
on most communication from litigants and counsel to current or potential class members in race
discrimination action held unconstitutionally to restrict expression), aff'd, 452 U.S. 89, 103-04
(1981) (deciding case on Rule 23 grounds but noting that trial court order created "serious restraints
on expression" and should be drafted cautiously and with "attention to whether the restraint
is justified by a likelihood of serious abuses"); Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d
578, 581 (7th ar. 1982) (observing that local laws against stimulating litigation could raise first
amendment problems if applied to ADEA representative plaintiffs); Arrington v. National Broadcasting Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D.D.C. 1982) (discussing tension between constitutionally
protected associational and group legal action rights and the Portal-to-Portal Act's restriction
of union representation in FLSA representative suits); Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613,
618 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (discussing connection between farmworkers' FLSA representative suit and
collective litigation activity protected by the first amendment).
36. Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 103-04.
37. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX Lm0ATION, supra note 34, § 1.41, at 27-28 & nn.43 & 53;
see also Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
38. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); see also In re Norton, 622 F.2d 917,
917 (5th Cir. 1980); Cada v. Costa Line, 93 F.R.D. 95, 98 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zarate v. Younglove,
86 F.R.D. 80, 85 (C.D. Cal. 1980). But see In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange
Lit., 594 F.2d 1106, 1138 n.57 (7th Cir. 1979) (Rule 23 class action suggesting inherent power
of court as possible basis for upholding local court rule drawn from Manual for Complex
Litigation).
Gulf Oil has been interpreted by subsequent courts as not permitting blanket prohibitions of
notice. See Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Kilgo v.
Bowman Transp., 88 F.R.D. 592, 595 (N.D. Ga. 1980); see also MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LmoATION, supra note 34, § 1.41, at 28.
39. Recognizing trial court discretion to permit notice in appropriate cases can prevent abuses.
See Braunstein v. Eastern Photo_graphic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (notice permitted in "appropriate" case), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979). Courts following
this approach deny notice when circumstances do not warrant notice. See, e.g., Frank v. Capital
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also is unjustified because abuses occasionally may occur. 40 In analogous
proceedings, such as notice adjudications in race discrimination or mass
accident class actions, courts have recognized the constitutional effect
judicially imposed notice restrictions have on free expression and association; restraints must be based on specific findings of necessity from
the facts presented by a particular case. 41 Given plausible alternative
interpretations of the statutory provision, courts should choose the most
constitutionally certain interpretation. 42 Consequently, courts should
permit notification in appropriate cases and avoid a constitutionally
vulnerable blanket prohibition of notice.
2. A voiding a multiplicity of suits- The congressional intent to
permit or deny notification also must be understood in the context of the
legitimate federal policy of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. 43 Providing
effective rights to bring and join a representative action can reduce
the multiplicity of suits. Indeed, in some cases, such as FLSA cases
brought by poor migrant workers, notification can be a practical prerequisite for the-exercise of the right to opt into a representative action. 44
In less extreme cases, notice often can facilitate joinder of class
members, 45 thus increasing use of the representative action as an alterCities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 678 (S.D.N. Y. 1981) (permitting only limited notice when
plaintiffs fail to demonstrate sufficient basis for notifying all employees); Kempton v. Southland
Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,984 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (recognizing the acceptability of notice
but prohibiting it because other sources provided notice, and additional notification could involve thousands of potential class members).
In class action cases brought under Rule 23, district courts apparently employ their discretion
to permit notification "in many ingenious and desirable ways." Miller, supra note 13, at 334;
see also Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REv. 664, 680-81 (1979).
40. See Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co, 619 F.2d 459, 475-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd, 452
U.S. 89 (1981); Miller, supra note 13, at 334.
41. Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101 (1981); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242,251 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1975); Cada v. Costa Line, 93 F.R.D.
95, 98 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 105 (C.D. Cal. 1980); see In re
Norton, 622 F.2d 917, 917 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. This rule of statutory interpretation has been applied to FLSA representative actions to
protect associational and Portal-to-Portal Act interests, and courts have denied an employer's
motion for summary judgment or disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel for acts that included
notifying class members of the pending representative action. See, e.g., Arrington v. National
Broadcasting Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D.D.C. 1982). See generally St. Martin Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 780 (1981) (articulating general principle of
avoiding constitutionally doubtful statutory constructions).
43. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); see also Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d
859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
44. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
.
45. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438,442 (N.D. Ill.) (notice promotes
ADEA's remedial purposes and prevents concealment of representative actions from potential
class members), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D.
638, 639-40 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (without notice, potential plaintiffs would learn of opportunity to
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native to multiple individual suits. 46 Judicial discretion to permit notice
enables courts to reduce the potential for multiple suits by allowing
notice in cases in which numerous individual actions otherwise would
occur. 47
3. Curtailing undesirable solicitation and stimulation of litigationNotification raises significant judicial and legislative concerns about
stimulation of litigation and undesirable solicitation of clients or funds. 48
opt into ADEA action only by chance); see also Note, The Class Action Suit Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Current Status, Controversies, and Suggested Clarifications,
32 HA.sTINos L.J. 1377, 1391 (1981) (if notice is not permitted, private ADEA actions are severely
limited).
46. A potential plaintiff alerted by notice might wait for the representative action to be adjudicated unless the statute of limitations will run. If the adjudication is favorable to employees,
the alerted employee might then invoke it as compelling authority under the doctrine of stare
decisis in his separate, but identically grounded, complaint. See Baker v. Michie Co., 93 F.R.D.
494, 497 (W.D. Va. 1982); Rahl, The Class Action Device and Employee Suits Under the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 37 Iu. L. REv. 119, 127 (1942) (stare decisis affects unnamed class members
who decline to opt into the representative action). Technically, the prior decision should not
collaterally estop relitigation of factual issues, for deliberate failure to join a pending action
is an exception to the general application of offensive collateral estoppel. See Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979). Obviously, the prior adjudication is not res judicata
because the latter action involves different parties.
Despite this possible incentive for claimants to wait before bringing separate actions, most
trial courts with experience with FLSA and ADEA representative actions believe representative
actions decrease the multiplicity of suits and increase the efficient use of judicial resources. See
Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 & n.l (N.D. Tex. 1982); Allen v. Marshall
Field & Co, 93 F.R.D. 438, 442, 444 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip
op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Soler
v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In some cases, however, individual actions
still may be more desirable. See Cantu v. Owatonna Canning Co., 90 Lab Cas. (CCH) 133,967
(D. Minn. 1978) (more convenient to try FLSA cases individually because plaintiffs were required to prove individual amounts of recovery).
Moreover, many potential plaintiffs that have been notified have no motive to await the represen•
tative action's adjudication. Class members who do not opt to join the representative action
do not benefit from a favorable judgment or settlement. Although they are not bound as parties
by an adverse decision, it nonetheless may be cited as adverse authority and influence the outcome of their action under general principles of stare decisis. As a practical matter, many class
members cannot afford individual actions and can obtain counsel only through contingent fee
arrangements and the prospect of court-awarded fees conditioned on the action's success. See
Hearings, supra note 22, at 267 (remarks of L. Metcalfe Walling, Administrator, Wage and
Hour and Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor).
47. See Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); Note, supra note 45, at 1382; BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 18, at 47; cf. FED. R. av. P. 23 advisory committee note ("principal
key" to propriety and value of class action device is its amelioration of the difficulties of separate
actions by class members). But cf. Miller, supra note 39, at 666 (concluding that there is little
empirical evidence on overall effects of class actions).
48. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 4S2 U.S. 89, 99 n.11 (1981); see also Cherner v. Transitron
Elec. Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934, 936-37 (D. Mass. 1962) (discussing improper solicitation in class
action context); 93 CoNo. REc. 2093 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell).
In general, stimulation of litigation and undesirable solicitation create dangers of "undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of privacy." In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426
(1978). Such litigation and solicitation raise the danger of subordinating claimants' interests to
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The extent to which solicitation and stimulation of litigation are
undesirable depend on three factors: the mode of communication; 49
the presence or absence of pecuniary motives for the communication; 50
and the extent to which the communication influences 51 or misleads 52
its targets.
In many FLSA and· ADEA cases, the -goal of curtailing undesirable
solicitation and litigation does not warrant prohibition of notice.
Notification typically is accomplished by posting information in the
workplace53 or mailing it to class members. 54 These communication
modes are not likely to contravene the policy against improper solicitation and stimulation of litigation because they do not require a prospective client to respond without time for reflection; 55 nor can they
unfairly compel participation in an action by threatening any imminent harm to class members, defendants, or the public. 56 Because these
modes of communication generate documentary evidence that can be
inspected, courts can effectively monitor abuses relating to the content
of notification in such cases. 51
Furthermore, although in some cases representative plaintiffs employ
the interests of the attorneys or other persons engaging in solicitation. See generally Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 461 n.19 (1978).
Neither Congress nor the courts have expressed much concern over the related problem of
"strike suits" - claims brought in bad faith and intended to pressure an employer into a settlement - in FLSA or ADEA contexts. The Jack of concern over FLSA or ADEA strike suits
may be due to the opt-in requirement that reduces the likelihood of bad faith representative
actions. Cf. 93 CoNo. REc. 2182 (1947) (statement of Sen. Donnell).
49. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 45S (1978).
SO. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 4S2 U.S. 89, 99 n.11 (1981); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
422 (1978).
SI. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U .S 447, 45S (1978) (distinguishing face-to-face
solicitation from mass media advertising because the latter is less likely to exert pressure on
the potential client).
S2. See In re R.M.J., 45S U.S. 191 (1982); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 4S9, 476 (5th
Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd, 4S2 U.S. 89 (1981).
S3. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 9S7, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Frank
v. Capital Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
S4. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 9S7, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982); Monroe
v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 640 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1981). Commentators consider bans on
posted or mailed attorney-to-client communications to be undesirable and possibly unconstitutional. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YoUNo, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 219 (Supp. 1982) (arguing that letters and other "non-face-to-face" solicitation, even if by a lawyer seeking pecuniary
gain, may be protected under Ohralik); Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the First Amendment,
1981 AM. B. FOUND. REsEARCH J. 967, 1019-20 (1981).
SS. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 4S1 n.13 (1978); Zarate v. Younglove,
86 F.R.D. 80, 96 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
S6. The force of objections to notice grounded on fears of solicitation and stimulation of
litigation is directly proportionate to the imminence of danger posed by the communication.
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 4S7 & n.13 (1978); Bernard v. Gulf Oil
Co., 619 F.2d 4S9, 474 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), aff'd, 4S2 U.S. 89 (1981). Mailed and posted
notice arguably pose no imminent danger. See Bernard, 619 F.2d at 474.
S1. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 4S7 n.13 (1978). Mailed or posted
notices can later be introduced as evidence of improprieties.
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private attorneys motivated by pecuniary gain, legal aid or public interest attorneys often represent plaintiffs. 58 Absence of a pecuniary
motive in such cases further reduces the need for concern about solicitation and stimulation of litigation. 59
Even when private attorneys represent the plaintiffs, FLSA and
ADEA provide for the award of reasonable attorney's fees, 60 thus
authorizing court assessment of fee arrangements and decreasing the
significance of improper pecuniary motives of counsel. The statutory
fee provisions should effectively deter and provide remedies for possible abuses. In addition, courts have the power to discourage improper
solicitation. 61
Even when potential abuses arise, they can adequately be avoided
on a case-by-case basis. In many cases, prohibition of notice will not
be necessary to prevent undesirable solicitation and stimulation of litigation. For example, different classes have members with different levels
of sophistication. 62 In contrast to the blanket prohibition of notice,
discretionary notice allows consideration of the individual circumstances
of each case. 63 If the analysis indicates a minimal danger of abuses
resulting in undesirable solicitation, the plaintiffs' rights of expression
and association should outweigh the policy against solicitation and
stimulation of litigation. Therefore, discretionary notice fully implements
the policy against improper solicitation and stimulation of litigation
while promoting the policies of protecting freedom of expression and
association and avoiding multiplicity of suits. 64
S8. See, e.g., Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613,618 (S.D. Te,c. 1979) (plaintiffs represented
by Texas Rural Legal Aid); cf. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 4S9, 472-73 (5th Cir. 1980)
(en bane), ofjd, 4S2 U.S. 89 (1981) (plaintiffs represented by Legal Defense Fund in race discrimination case); Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., 87 F.R.D. 592, S9S (N.D. Ga. 1980) (plaintiffs represented
by American Civil Liberties Union in sex discrimination case).
59. See Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613, 618 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Cantu v. Owatonna
Canning Co., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 33,965 (D. Minn. 1978).
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
61. For instance, courts can refuse to enforce fee arrangements resulting from improper solicitation, 4 CLASS ACTION REP. 626, 627-28 (197S), or review attorney requests to serve as representative counsel, see, e.g., Cantu v. Owatonna Canning Co., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,965 (D.
Minn. 1978) (considering and approving representation by salaried legal aid lawyers in Farm
Labor Contractor Registration Act, FLSA, and state fair labor standards act claims); Shields
v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1971) (Truth-in-Lending Act claim).
. 62. See Martin v. Lefhoff, 2 Wage & Hour Cas. 590 (E.D. Tenn. 1942) (class of "working
girls"); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978) (potential for "overreaching solicitation increases when solicitous persons are unsophisticated, injured, or distressed").
63. See Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 9S9-60 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (considering the communication mode); Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613, 617-18 (S.D. Tex. 1979)
(counsel had no pecuniary interest in action); Cantu v. Owatonna Canning Co., 90 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 1 33,96S (D. Minn. 1978) (considering legal aid attorneys' motives in Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act and FLSA representative action in which notice was granted).
64. At least four other policies affect the permissibility of notice: (1) the need to protect
plaintiffs in obtaining information from absent class members, Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); (2) the need to protect against harm to the
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DEVELOPING STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING WHEN NOTICE
SHOULD BE PERMITTED

Trial courts should have the discretion to determine whether representative plaintiffs should be allowed to notify class members. In determining whether notice is appropriate, trial courts should balance the
competing federal policies and interests of representative plaintiffs, class
members, defendants, and counsel.
A representative plaintiff seeking permission to notify other class
members should have the burden of establishing that notice is appropriate under the circumstances of the case. 65 If a representative plaintiff meets this burden of proof, the trial court should permit notice
unless it makes specific findings of fact indicating that notice poses
an imminent threat of substantial harm to class members, rights of
the parties, or the public interest and that this threat outweighs notice's
advantages. 66 In such cases, the court should issue a narrowly tailored
rights of absent class members when they cannot afford individual actions, Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 185-86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Cantu v. Owatonna
Canning Co., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 33,965 (D. Minn. 1978); Miller, supra note 39, at 666;
(3) the need to protect defendants from unreasonable discovery costs, Woods v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 1982) (federal courts should exercise their power to limit
burdensome-discovery); (4) the need to promote "fundamental fairness," Johnson v. American
Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D.
613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979)).
65. See Haynes v. Singer Co., 696 F.2d 884, 887 (11th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs have "burden
of demonstrating a reasonable basis for crediting their assertions that aggrieved individuals existed in the broad class that they proposed"); Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D.
674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dickey v. Wendy's Int'!, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1026, 1027
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to authorize notice because plaintiff did not prove that class members
whose claims had been settled had asserted any new claims).
66. Discretionary notice allows judges to balance constitutional rights, see supra note 34,
to prevent multiple suits, see supra note 47, and to monitor attorney abuses, see supra notes 55-51.
See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960 n.1, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1982)
(considering the effect of class members' awareness and financial position on likelihood of multiple
suits); Dudo v. Schaffer, 93 F.R.D. 524, 534-35 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (restricting pretrial communications between attorney and class of former union members after considering potential for
suggestiveness).
Some courts, exercising discretion, have denied notice because of specific findings and policy
applications. See Frank v. Capital Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(granting notice to employees in representative plaintiffs' corporate division but denying notice
to employees of another division); Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,984
(W.D. Tex. 1981) (receptive to notice but denying it because the case might have required thousands
of letters); Dickey v. Wendy's Int'!, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 1026, 1026-27 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (adopting discretionary approach but denying notice because nationwide settlement had
been negotiated); see also Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 87 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 33,852 (D. Md.
1979) (granting notice and differentiating an earlier decision denying notice because there had
been sufficient class awareness due to settlement offer letters); Geller v. Markham, 19 Fair. Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1623 (D. Conn. 1979) (granting notice of ADEA suit that met tests
similar to Rule 23 and distinguishing an earlier decision denying notice because of sufficient class
awareness due to publicity), rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
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denial of notice. 67
Judges should consider many factors in determining whether notice
is appropriate in a particular case. 68 The trial court should weigh the
considerations to protect the right to bring or join a representative action and to advance federal policies in each particular case.

A. Awareness of Class Members
In many cases, employees are unaware not only of the existence of
a pending FLSA or ADEA representative action, but also are unaware
of their substantive rights or their right to join a pending representative
action. 69 Class members' ignorance of their rights undermines FLSA
and ADEA goals of eliminating substandard labor conditions and arbitrary age discrimination in employment. 10 Therefore, courts should
consider class members' awareness of their substantive rights in determining whether to permit notice. 71
The awareness of class members also affects the federal policy of
avoiding a multiplicity of suits. 72 Class members aware of their substantive rights but ignorant of their opportunity to join a pending representative action are more likely to bring separate suits than class members
aware of the pending representative action. Notification can reduce
61. See supra notes 41 & 66.
68. Representative plaintiffs, however, need not prove that each relevant consideration favors
notice in their situation. See Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 960-61 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (representative plaintiffs and class members were highly paid flight officers); Allen
v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442-43, 447 (N.D. Ill.) (possible conflict of interest
among plaintiffs because class included both former and current employees with varying claims),
rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 641 n.l (N.D.
Ill. 1981) (pecuniarily interested counsel).
69. See, e.g., Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639-640 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (prohibiting notification would leave class members informed only by chance); Soler v. G & U, Inc.,
86 F.R.D. 524, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (informing class members of their rights "requires broad
dissemination of information to the class of persons potentially affected by the suit"); Riojas
v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (considering facts suggesting that without
notice class members probably never would know of their rights nor how to exercise them).
10. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 442, 444-45 (N.D. Ill.) (considering
defendant's failure to post notices informing employees of ADEA rights and permitting notice
because it promotes ADEA's remedial purpose), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op.
at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); see also
Solar v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. S24, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D.
613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Note, supra note 45, at 1381.
71. See supra note 69; Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 .33,984 (W.D.
Tex. 1981); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 87 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,852 (D. Md. 1979); Geller
v. Markham, 19 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1623-24 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
72. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Fi~ld & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 444 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D. 638, 639-40 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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the number of actions filed later by informing class members of the
opportunity to join the existing representative action.
Many characteristics can indicate the awareness of class members:
membership in a labor union likely to inform them of a pending
representative action, 73 employment at a workplace in which Department of Labor FLSA or ADEA notices are posted, 74 their understanding of written and spoken English. 75 The migratory employment of
class members, 16 geographic dispersal of the class, 77 and the extent and
nature of publicity about the representative action' 8 are also relevant.

B.

Poverty of Representative Plaintiffs and Class Members

Courts should also consider employees' poverty in deciding whether
to permit notice, because ignorance of the opportunity to join a
representative action most severely undermines FLSA and ADEA rights
to sue when the aggrieved employees are poor. 79 The representative
action allows impoverished employees to obtain counsel because attorneys may be attracted by the possibility of a share of a large award
or settlement. 80 If notice is prohibited and the poor employee who desires
to sue remains ignorant of the opportunity to join a representative action, the employee is likely to be unable to bring an individual action
later because of high litigation costs. 81
73. Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 270 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (upholding trial court refusal
of notice of Equal Pay Act claims because consent forms were circulated by workers' union).
14. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 444, 445 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on
other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W.
3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) f 33,984 (W.D.
Tex. 1981).
15. See, e.g., Kempton v. Southland Corp., 90 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 133,984 (W.D. Tex. 1981);
Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
16. See Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D. 613, 619,. (S.D. Tex. 1979).
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F. Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
18. See, e.g., Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438, 443 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611
(U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Even if attentive to these factors, the trial courts' evaluation of class member awareness will
not be mathematically precise. The law authorizes trial courts to make similarly imperfect evaluations in other class action contexts. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2) ("the court may make
appropriate orders . . . requiring, for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in
such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action").
Federal courts have experience in evaluating such qualitative factors in reaching a fair result.
19. See Riojas v. Seal Produce, 82 F.R.D 613, 619 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (considering the poverty
of farmworkers in FLSA action).
80. Note, supra note 45, at 1391-92 (favoring representative actions with notice in part because
many attorneys are unwilling to handle individual ADEA claims for small fees). See generally
Class Actions: The Settlement of Class Actions, the Problems of Determination of Classes, Notice
and Settlement, 63 F.R.D. 169, 176 (1973) (Reports of the Conference for District Court Judges).
Bl. See Hearings, supra note 22, at 206 (Lee Pressman, general counsel, Congress of Industrial Organizations, stating that employees usually cannot afford to pay lawyers' fees).
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Moreover, prohibiting notice also threatens the ability of an indigent
representative plaintiff to continue a viable representative action. The
attractiveness of the action to the representative plaintifrs counsel
decreases as does the number of class members. 82 Without money or
the ability to attract a large class, counsel will be unobtainable or unmotivated. Courts should recognize that at some level of poverty, class
members will be financially unable to bring individual suits even if
notified of their rights. Therefore, any danger that notice will generate
a multiplicity of suits is reduced when the class is relatively poor, for
the practical effect of notice will be joinder in the pending action or
abandonment of the claim.
C.

Size of Claims

Similarly, the size of the individual damages claimed affects the
likelihood of multiple suits. Notice to small claimants is less likely to
cause excessive litigation because, due to lack of personal financial incentive, they are less likely to bring individual suits than larger claimants.
The need for notice to protect the interests of small claimants parallels
the importance of notice to impoverished class members. 83 The cost
of individual suits deters small claimants, and representative actions

Although the FLSA authorized the Secretary of Labor to sue on behalf of employees to recover
unpaid minimum or overtime wages, 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (Supp. V 1981), Congress relied in large
part on litigation by private parties to enforce the FLSA. See 83 CONG. REc. 9264 (1938) (statement of Rep. Keller). The Secretary of Labor often did not initiate actions, even in egregious
situations. For example, in Soler v. G & U, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 524, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), despite
the imminent expiration of the statutory limitation period, and notwithstanding farmworkers'
poverty, illiteracy, and ignorance of FLSA procedural opportunities, the Department of Labor
did not initiate an FLSA action. The enforcement functions previously exercised by the Department of Labor have been transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 1, 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1982). But private representative
actions remain the remedy for many employees. See Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D.
438, 440, 444 n.7 (N.D. Ill.) (more than four years elapsed between alleged beginning of
discriminatory policy and filing of first EEOC charge), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667,
slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983).
82. Attorneys for successful FLSA or ADEA plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the trial court. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 626(b) (1976). Courts determining
attorney fees in class actions commonly consider the amount in controversy and the size of any
s·ettlement or award to the class. See 3 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 6922, at 1132 (1977).
If few class members opt into the representative action, both factors remain small and therefore
decrease the fee of representative plaintiffs' counsel, even if the suit is successful. This, in tum,
decreases the ability of the representative plaintiff to retain counsel and effectively litigate.
83. Poverty reduces an employee's financial ability to bring an individual action; a small
claim reduces an employee's incentive to bring an individual action. See generally 3 H. NEWBERG,
supra note 82, § 6900, at 1115; Note, Reconsidering Union Class Representation in Title VII
Suits, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1627, 1628 n.11 (1982); Note, supra note 45, at 1391. Therefore, when
a claim becomes large enough to decrease the need for notice depends on the costs of an individual action.
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may be the only means available to vindicate their rights. 84 Effective
representative actions, in turn, often require notice. 85

D.

Common Issues of Law and Fact

The desirability of representative actions with notice is directly related
to the extent of common factual and legal issues among class members'
claims. 86 Like class actions authorized by Rule 23, FLSA and ADEA
representative actions can promote efficient use of judicial and
advocatory resources when factual and legal commonalities among
claims are great. 87 Extensive similarities further reduce the danger of
multiple suits by facilitating consolidation of any individual actions
that notification might stimulate. 88

E.

Pecuniary Interest of Counsel

Courts have distinguished private practitioners from salaried attorneys
employed or furnished by nonprofit legal groups or legal aid
organizations; 89 the latter have no pecuniary interest in the outcome
84. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 34, § 1.45, at 49-50. But see Miller,
supra note 39, at 685 n:92, arguing that although small claimants currently lack alternatives
to class actions, in the future they may benefit from an increased number of lawyers interested
in social action litigation. Increases in social activism by attorneys, however, may not continue.
Id. at 675 n.56.
85. See supra notes 28-29.
86. See Geller v. Markham, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1622, 1623 (D. Conn. 1979),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981).
Rahl, supra note 46, at 130-32, argues that if th~re are few common factual and legal questions,
an FLSA representative action is of little value. Class members' claims must have some common
factual and legal issues in any representative action because employees must be "similarly situated"
to the representative plaintiff to opt into the representative action. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
Nonetheless, the extent of commonality varies. Compare Johnson v. American Airlines, 531 F.
Supp. 957, 961 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (class of current and former flight deck crew members of defendant
whose 60th birthdays occur between April 6, 1978, and December 31, 1984) with Frank v. Capital
Cities Communications, 88 F.R.D. 674, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (class comprising present and some
former employees of three defendants who were between ages 40 and 70 upon termination of
their employment). The class in Frank included employees of affiliated corporations that had
not set the policies in question and so were not considered the employers of any of the plaintiffs.
88 F.R.D. at 677-78.
87. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committ~ note (only when legal and factual commonalities
predominate over individual questions does class format achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense).
88. Federal district courts have broad power to consolidate claims with common questions
of law and fact. See FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a). District courts will consolidate individual FLSA
suits if they present common factual and legal questions. See, e.g., Lantz v. B-1202 Corp., 429
F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (consolidation pursuant to local rule). See generally Class
Actions: The Settlement of Class Actions, the Problems of Determination of Classes, Notice
and Settlement, supra note 80, at 174.
89. See supra note 58. An attorney in traditional private practice stands to benefit financially
by adding plaintiffs to a representative suit if he or she has an interest in the size of any settle-
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of a representative action. 90 The likelihood of improper solicitation
increases if a representative plaintiff's counsel seeking notice has a
pecuniary interest in the case. 91 More careful scrutiny of private counsel
requests for notice should promote the federal policy against improper
solicitation. In addition, courts should be more willing to permit notice
when the attorney has no pecuniary interest in the case.
Similarly, courts that are legitimately worried about the appearance
of improper solicitation should consider the pecuniary interest of
counsel. Conduct that appears improper, even if actually proper,
nonetheless may undermine public confidence in the legal system. 92 The
likelihood of an appearance of impropriety increases when notice is
sought by a pecuniarily interested counsel rather than counsel with no
pecuniary interest in the case. 93
Courts should not deny notice merely because counsel for the plaintiffs has a financial stake in the outcome. 94 Courts should consider
the likelihood of abuse by the attorney as one of the many factors
in deciding whether to allow the plaintiff to notify class members.
CONCLUSION

No FLSA or ADEA provision expressly prohibits representative plaintiffs or counsel from notifying similarly situated individuals of penment or award that might result from the action. The private practitioner may also seek to add
plaintiffs to the representative action in hopes of representing them in other, unrelated matters.
90. Rules of legal ethics reflect this distinction. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT
Rule 7.3 (1983), for example, restricts communication to prospective clients more severely when
a "significant motive" for the communication is the attorney's pecuniary gain than when pecuniary
motives are absent. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmn.rrY DR 2-104(A)(3) (1980)
exempts attorneys that are "recommended, furnished, or paid" by qualified legal aid organizations from certain restrictions on unsolicited legal advice.
91. See supra note 59.
92. See lowA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILlTY FOR LAWYERS EC 9-2 (1981); Wis. s.
CT. R. 20.48(2) (examples of state rules implementing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmIIJTY EC 9-2 (1980)).
93. Recent bar rulings reflect decreased concern over the appearance of impropriety when
counsel has no pecuniary interest in soliciting class members. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1439 (1979). See generally Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 n.11 (1981) (observing that concerns about stimulating litigation in class
action contexts are "particularly misplaced" in connection with actions brought by nonprofit
organizations such as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
The organized bar has long condemned the appearance of impropriety. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIIJTY Canon 9, EC 9-6 (1980). Courts have expressed concern that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided by counsel in FLSA representative actions. See, e.g.,
Arrington v. National Broadcasting Co., 531 F. Supp. 498, 506 (D.D.C. 1982).
94. The pecuniary interest factor does not operate as a routine bar to notice in cases in which
representative plaintiffs' counsel are private practitioners. See, e.g., Johns.on v. American Airlines,
531 F. Supp. 957, 966 n.l (N.D. Tex. 1982); Allen v. Marshall Field & Co., 93 F.R.D. 438,
447 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, No. 82-1667, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir. Sept. 22, 1982),
cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.w·. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1983); Monroe v. United Air Lines, 90 F.R.D.
638, 641 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1981).

42

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 17:1

ding representative actions. Unless the legislative histories of the FLSA
and the ADEA or federal policies indicate otherwise, trial courts should
retain their inherent powers to permit notice. Both legislative history
and analysis of federal policies indicate that trial courts should permit
notice in appropriate cases. Because neither legislative history nor federal
policies suggest representative plaintiffs in all cases have a right to notify,
a trial court should have discretion to deny notification requests in
cases inappropriate for notice.
Trial court discretion should be exercised so as to effectuate FLSA
and ADEA rights to bring or join representative actions and to advance the federal policies behind FLSA and ADEA remedies. If notice
does not conflict with competing policies against promoting solicitation and vexatious litigation, it should be allowed. In determining
whether notice promotes FLSA and ADEA rights, courts should
specifically consider the awareness and poverty of class members, the
amount of damages claimed, the extent of common issues of law and
fact, and the pecuniary interest of counsel. Moreover, any restrictions
of notice should be tailored to prevent specific abuses and still allow
plaintiffs to pursue the federal goals promoted by the FLSA and ADEA.

-Thomas Ashby

